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Novartis and the U.N. Global Compact
Initiative
Lee A. Tavis*
ABSTRACT

The U.N. Global Compact initiativeevolved from a challenge
posed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the business
community at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January
1999. "I call on you-individually through your firms, and
collectively through your business associations-to embrace,
support, and enact a set of core values in the areas of human
rights, labor standards and environmental practices.", His
vision is "to give a human face to the global market.' Over a
year of intense interactionamong business chief executive officers
and associations,non-governmental organizations,labor unions,
and four U.N. agencies led to the formulation of nine principles.
Business is invited to embrace these principles, incorporating
them into their strategies and decisions.
At core, the nine principles are based on fundamental
human rights as articulated in various U.N. documents. The
base document is, of course, the 1948 Universal Declarationof
Human Rights. Its broad acceptance provides a legitimate
touchstone virtually anywhere in the world. The first two
principles ask business to,
1. Support and respect the protection of internationally
proclaimed human rights within their sphere of
influence.
2. Make sure they are not complicit in human rights
abuses.
Principles three through six are based on the 1998
InternationalLabour OrganizationDeclarationon Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work. These principles request that
businesses,

* This business case study of Novartis was prepared by Lee Tavis of the Mendoza

College of Business at the University of Notre Dame as a learning document for the
United Nations Global Compact Learning Forum. Quotes are taken from interviews
and Novartis publications along with news media references.
1.
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Business and
Human Rights: A ProgressReport, at http://www.unhchr.chlbusiness.htm.
Id.
2.
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3.

Uphold the freedom of association and effective
recognition of the right to collective bargaining.
4. Promote the elimination of all forms of forced and
compulsory labour.
5. Promote the effective abolitionof child labour.
6. Uphold the elimination of discriminationin respect of
employment and occupation.
The remaining three principles relate to protection of the
environment, tied to the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development and the comprehensive plan for sustainable
development outlined in Agenda 21. Accordingly, these three
principles ask businesses to,
7. Support a precautionary approach to environmental
challenges.
8. Undertake initiatives to promote greaterenvironmental
responsibility.
9. Encourage the development and diffusion of
environmentally friendly technologies.
The Global Compact is a voluntary initiative with no
framework for legal enforcement. The decision to embrace the
principles is up to the individual enterprise. There is no
screening of firms that join the Compact and no U.N.
endorsement. Member companies become participantsin a set of
embedded networks working toward the considerationof human
rights in business activities.
Joining the Compact involves a letter of commitment from
the CEO. Companies are then asked to describe in their annual
financial reports or other prominent corporate reports (such as
sustainability reports) the actions they are undertaking in
support of the Global Compact's principles through the
engagement mechanisms of Learning,Dialogue,Local Networks,
and Projects.
For some companies, independent academic analysts are
invited to assess the implementation of the nine principles. The
attachedcase, one of the first, is a study of Novartis A.G., a large
Swiss pharmaceutical enterprise. The report analyzes the
inclusion of the Global Compact as an integralpart of a strategy
for sustainable corporate development. Based on managerial
interviews, the process of initiating a principles-basedhuman
rights dimension into managerialbehavior is assessed.**

** There are numerous sources of information on the Global Compact, availableat
http://www.unglobalcompact.org For a valuable analysis, co-authored by the Executive
Head of the Global Compact Office, see George Kell & David Levin, The Evolution of the

2003]

NOVARTISAND GLOBAL COMPACT INITIA TIVE
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.

STRATEGIC POSITIONING .............................................

738

Post Merger Economic Consolidation ..............
Strategic Expansion To Include
Corporate Citizenship ......................................

738

1.1
1.2
2.

C ITIZEN SH IP ................................................................

741

A Focus on Process ...........................................
Valuable Experience .........................................
From Concept To Action ...................................
Establishing Credibility ...................................

742
743
745
750
751
752

2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.

EXAMPLES OF IMPLEMENTATION .................................

3.1

3.2
4.

739

OPERATIONALIZING A STRATEGY OF CORPORATE

Responsibility for Access To Drugs ..................
Research on Tropical Diseases:
3.1.1
E xam ple #1 ...........................................
3.1.2 Ensuring Access To a Viable
Commercial Drug: Example #2 ............
Ensuring the Rights of Workers:
E xam ple #3 .......................................................

753
754
757

759
PRESENT STATUS .........................................................
PEOPLE INTERVIEW ED .................................................
A PPEND IX ....................................................................

761
763

The spirit of the Global Compact found fertile ground and has
become an integral part of Novartis corporate strategy since the
enterprise was formed by the merger of the two large Swiss
pharmaceutical companies, Sandoz and Ciba, in 1996. Following a
four-year concentration on economic consolidation and performance,
Daniel Vasella (Chairman and CEO) signed the Global Compact.
Together, productivity-based economic performance and a proactive
approach to the expectations of society are envisioned as the key to
long-term corporate success in the rapidly integrating global economic,
political, and social environment of today's large multinational
corporation.
This Article outlines the Novartis strategy and its
implementation, including the coalescing role of the Global Compact in
the drive for sustainable corporate development. Following a review of
extending corporate strategy to incorporate social concerns into the
economic business model in Part I, the process of implementing the

Global Compact Network: An Historical Experiment in Learning and Action, at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org.
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strategy will be assessed in Part II. In Part III, specific examples of
3
this strategic positioning will be outlined.

1. STRATEGIC POSITIONING

1.1 Post Merger Economic Consolidation
Ciba and Sandoz approached the merger into Novartis ("new
skills" in Latin) as an operating response to the growing competition,
concentration, and institutional buying structure in the globally
integrating life science industry. Both companies had roots in Basel
dye production during the late 19th century, and had entered the
merger after what The Operational Review called, "their best year
ever."4 External observers, however, were less reassuring as to the
past history of the two companies. According to Forbes, "Sandoz and
Ciba-Geigy were plodding, risk averse and assiduously Swiss firms
that often got trounced by faster, fiercer U.S. rivals. The research
pipeline was dry, and marketers were slow on the draw. ' 5 On the
other side, financial analysts embraced enthusiastically the formation
of Novartis resulting from the largest industrial merger in history at
that time, and forming the world's largest life science company
(healthcare, agribusiness, and nutrition) and the second largest
pharmaceutical firm.
The post-merger period of intense
performance-based
consolidation included changes in the structure of the firm as well as
its management system:
*

At the time of the merger Ciba's Dyestuffs, Additives, and Plastics
divisions were spun off into a separate company called "Ciba
Speciality Chemicals."

*

Due to the lack of substantial synergies with other Novartis
activities, Agriculture was divested in 2000 and merged with the
agricultural division of Astra-Zeneca to form the Syngenta
corporation. At that time, the agribusiness operation was the

3.
For an extensive, nuanced report on the implementation of the Global
Compact Initiative within the changing multinational pharmaceutical environment, see
Klaus M. Leisinger, Towards Globalization With a Human Face: Implementation of
the UN Global Compact Initiativeat Novartis,at http://www.foundation.novartis.com.
An executive with Novartis and at a predecessor firm since 1974, Leisinger is
President and Executive Director of the Novartis Foundation for Sustainable
Development. He is a member of the Steering Committee charged with implementing
the Global Compact at Novartis and is closely associated with the process.
4.

NOVARITS, ONLY ONE COMPANY: NOVARTIS OPERATIONAL REVIEW 6 (1996).

5.

Robert Langreth, Reviving Novartis, FORBES, Feb. 5, 2001, at 90-96.
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largest in the world. It represented 28 percent of Novartis revenue
and 24 percent of operating income.
*

In 2000, Novartis shares were listed on the U.S. stock exchange as
American Depository Receipts, positioning Novartis as more
attractive to U.S. investors.

*

Merger personnel redundancies were reduced largely through
natural attrition and early retirements. Some employees started
their own businesses with financial support from the Novartis
Venture Fund. The first year following the merger, the workforce
was reduced by 9,199, at which point 62 percent of the anticipated
merger cost synergies and the targeted 12 percent workforce
reduction were achieved. At the same time, 2,400 new people with
needed expertise were hired.

"

During the consolidation phase, one-third of the 100 most senior
managers joined Novartis from other companies. In the United
States, of the top 13 executives in 1999, only 2 remain.

*

Performance-based compensation was rigorously applied across the
company with total compensation targeting the 50th percentile of
the compensation offered by a set of comparable competitors. Over
6,000 employees now receive share options as part of their
remuneration.

*

The pharmaceutical business was split into worldwide strategic
business units centered around therapeutic areas and customers
with some of its global management headquartered in the United
States.

*

The Novartis presence in the U.S. market was dramatically
increased-the sales force growing from 3,100 to 4,600 in 1999
alone, probably the fastest expansion in pharmaceutical history.
Using direct-to-consumer advertising, upgrading sales training, and
accepting the risk of comparing their products with the best the
industry has to offer in clinical trials and post approval marketing,
the Wall Street Journalcredits Vasella with "transferring the firm
6
into a bare-knuckled, American-style marketing powerhouse."

"

The process of drug discovery and development was reorganized
and revitalized to get drugs to the market more quickly. At the
time of the merger, over one-half of drug sales were from patentexpired products. Development time has been shortened from 12 to
about 8 years, with a sharper market-oriented focus.

*

The financial performance (See Appendix A) reflects the synergistic
value of the merger and the emphasis on managerial performance.

1.2 Strategic Expansion To Include Corporate Citizenship
By 2000, with the consolidation process becoming secure, Vasella
believed Novartis had achieved the economic freedom to be more
encompassing in its response to societal claims on business

6.
Gardiner Harris & Vanessa Fuhrmans, Its Rivals in a Funk, NovartisFinds
A Technique to Thrive: Swiss Drug Maker Embraces Bare-Knuckled Marketing, WALL
ST. J. (online version), Aug. 23, 2002, at http://online.wsj.com.
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enterprises. In July, Novartis signed the U.N. Global Compact
following a conversation between Kofi Annan and Daniel Vasella. The
Global Compact served an important coalescing role as Novartis moved
to a sustainable long-term position in the market. Urs Baerlocher, the
senior executive for implementing the policy, described the role of the
Global Compact, "The Global Compact, its principles and requirement
to demonstrate credible action, triggered a discussion within Novartis
on the nature of human rights, access to medicines, and the existing
Code of Conduct, which led to our Corporate Citizenship Policy as an
encompassing view of Novartis responsibility." 7 According to Karin
Schmitt, "The Global Compact was an opportunity to show the
Novartis commitment to human rights values, and the determination
to live up to them realizing that we are inviting public scrutiny."8
The generality of the Global Compact principles needed to be
particularized for the specific Novartis environment as a first step in
implementation. The Corporate Citizenship Policy translates these
principles to fit Novartis as a global pharmaceutical company. During
its year-long preparation, Novartis planners sought the counsel of
nongovernmental organizations such as the World Resources Institute,
SustainAbility Ltd., and the Stakeholder Forum for Our Common
Future (formerly UNED Forum).

Introducing the Policy on Corporate Citizenship in October 2001,
Vasella stated,
The Policy was developed in response to our commitment to the Global
Compact, which was set forth by the Secretary General of the United
Nations, Kofi Annan.
Across geographies and throughout our
organization we will, in all our business, social, and environmental
activities, strive to be in line with the principles of the Global Compact.
We believe that adhering to values is especially important for large
organizations in times of rapid change and globalization, as they provide
guiding principles. In our business, we are using innovative new
technologies to search for novel lifesaving medical treatments. In some
cases, these developments raise ethical challenges which must be
carefully considered with the establishment of proper boundaries, but
Novartis' ultimate goal is to contribute to helping patients in need.
On a global level, Novartis is committed to sustainable development and
its three principles of economic, social, and environmental progress. We
want to be a leading corporate citizen, both technologically and
economically, and achievement of that goal is closely linked to our
ability to contribute to the benefit of people. Our Policy on Corporate

7.
Interview with Urs Baerlocher, Head, Legal and General Affairs, Novartis
International AG, in Basel, Switz. (July 4, 2002).
8.
Interview with Karin Schmitt, Head, Social Development, Novartis
Foundation for Sustainable Development, at University of Notre Dame, Ind. (Aug. 24,
2002).
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Citizenship outlines our pledge, and it is both a strategic business
9
initiative-and the right thing to do.

At Novartis, corporate citizenship is not considered a socially
responsive add-on. It is intended to be an integral, necessary
component of a successful pharmaceutical company. Novartis is
serious about this being a strategic business initiative. Martin Batzer
(Head, Pharma Affairs) described this initiative in terms of a "license
to operate."
It is the third concentric circle in a strategy of economic maximization
for shareholders; attention to other stakeholders including associates
(the Novartis term for employees), customers, and communities; and the
third part of continuing attention to the permission of society for the
right of the corporation to exist. Integrating these three circles and
ensuring that the third (license to operate) feeds back into the other two
is the key to sustainable corporate development in the long-term. If you
10
don't have the license to operate, you can forget everything else.

Furthermore, as noted by Terry Barnett, "Right now, as a
pharmaceutical company, that license seems to be up for renegotiation.
At issue is the appropriate role of the pharmaceutical industry in the
total healthcare environment." 11 Baerlocher stated, "If we want to be
truly successful we need to achieve beyond products and services. We
also need our stakeholders to recognize that we are a valuable part of
society, a good corporate citizen. ' 12 Johannes Frey noted, "Often the
pursuit of corporate citizenship can have a direct payoff. You follow a
risk management approach as we have refined it in our Health, Safety,
and Environment Practices of incurring an expense now to minimize
Corporate citizenship is an
great damage down the road.
13
investment."

2. OPERATIONALIZING A STRATEGY OF CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP

In its Policy on Corporate Citizenship, Novartis commits itself to the
broad vision of human rights-the same base as the Global Compact
principles,
The Novartis core values are based on the fundamental rights of every
individual, such as the protection of privacy, freedom of opinion and
expression, freedom of association, nondiscrimination, and the right to

Daniel Vasella, M.D., CEO Statement, in CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AT
9.
NOVARTIS 3 (2001-2002) (on file with author).
10.
Interview with Martin Batzer, Head, Pharma Affairs, Novartis Pharma AG,
in Basel, Switz. (July 3, 2002).
11.
Interview with Terry Barnett, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Novartis Corporation, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 13, 2002).
12.
Interview with Urs Baerlocher, supra note 7.
13.
Interview with Johannes Frey, Head, Corporate Affairs, Novartis
International AG, in Basel, Switz. (July 10, 2002).
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be heard. We seek to promote and protect the rights defined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations within
our sphere of influence. We do not tolerate human rights abuses within
14
our own business operations.

2.1 A Focus on Process
This policy goes well beyond the political and civil rights that form
the core of what are called the first generation of human rights to
include second generation economic, social, and cultural rights. In
most business activities, it is the second generation rights that are to
be promoted and protected "within our sphere of influence" and the
abuses which will not be tolerated "within our own business
operation." These second generation rights are far more difficult to
specify; society is continually redefining its human rights concerns and
acceptable thresholds; while national legislation supports these rights,
they have received only modest recognition in the constitutions of
modern Western cultures; they can easily become politicized; they can
contradict one another; and protecting second generation rights can be
expensive.
Given the continuing advance of societal expectations for the
private sector, and based on a foundation of valuable experience in
responding to environmental and social needs, Novartis is focusing on
the process of achieving corporate citizenship. The process begins with
an articulation of one's ultimate vision, as quoted above, supported by
a strategy and a system that incrementally ratchet toward that vision
through a steady process of setting, measuring, achieving, testing, and
refining standards. The idea is to establish a transparent process
relating to those inside as well as outside the firm where objectives can
be adapted as learning and measurements are refined. There will be
shortfalls as Norman Walker noted, "I can't say we will meet all of our
requirements today. It's a journey we have started with the purpose of
seeing that our standards are achieved.' 5 In the final analysis,
however, as Vasella stated, "Don't make commitments you can't
keep."16

14.
NOVARTIS, Policy on Corporate Citizenship, in CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AT
NOVARTIS, supra note 9, at 5.
15.
Interview with Norman Walker, Head, Human Resources, Novartis
International AG, in Basel, Switz. (July 3, 2002).
16.
Interview with Daniel Vasella, M.D., Chief Executive Officer and Chairman,
Novartis International AG, in Basel, Switz. (July 1, 2002).
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2.2 Valuable Experience

In its implementation efforts, Novartis draws on a valuable
history of involvement with civil society in its environmental and social
response through its Health, Safety, and Environment (HSE) initiative
and the Novartis Foundation for Sustainable Development.
The HSE initiative began in the early technologically-driven,
production-focused ecological era of the 1980s. Over time, HSE has
become a part of line managerial responsibility analyzed annually in
the context of local legal requirements, relative impact, competitive
performance, and available state-of-the-art technology. Targets are set
for each sector, performance measured (116 sites in 2001), externally
verified, and published in detail. The development of this HSE process
over the years has benefited substantially from dialogue with
representatives from the other components of civil society.
The HSE experience has helped Novartis find a balance between
precaution and innovation in applying the "precautionary approach."
This approach, more than any other clause of the Global Compact, has
created hesitancy among firms in the United States. The Global
Compact is not specific in its seventh principle, asking firms to
"Support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges." The
principle is defined in the U.N. Rio Declaration: "Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation."'1 7 In applying the
approach to human health as well as the environment, Novartis makes
a distinction between prevention and precaution. Prevention applies
when there is a scientifically known cause and effect. Prevention is an
issue of cost. Precaution applies when there is scientific uncertainty.
As Kaspar Eigenmann pointed out, "When the activity could lead to
grave consequences, even if there is no full scientific proof, one should
take reasonable measures. The principle makes common sense. It's
the application that creates controversy-how is the reasonable
likelihood or the application of reasonable measures to be
determined?"18 The Novartis position stated, "We take a precautionary
approach in the innovation and development of new products and
technologies. To this end, we follow a step-by-step approach, we
engage in scientific peer review, and we consider benefits and risks of
innovation in a scientific and transparent manner,"' 19 a position
initially "challenged" by the U.S. legal staff. Alternatively, as Julie

17.
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, at Principle 15, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26, Aug. 12, 1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 877 (1992).
18.
Interview with Kaspar Eigenmann, Head, Corporate Health, Safety, and
Environment, Novartis International AG, in Basel, Switz. (July 4-5, 2002).
19.
Policy on Corporate Citizenship, supra note 14, at 5.
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advise about the
Kane noted, "Lawyers are nervous, but their role is 2to
0
risk so management can make the right decision."
The Novartis Foundation for Sustainable Development
concentrates on sustainable development in the poor regions of the
world. With the philosophy that "only autonomous development can
constitute sustainable development," 21 social development projects are
undertaken in partnership with local nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs). Some of these projects are working with AIDS orphans in
Northern Tanzania and South and East Africa; conflict management
and the empowerment of women in Palestine; community development
in Brazil and Sri Lanka; as well as leprosy cure and rehabilitation in
partnership with the World Health Organization (WHO), National
Health authorities, and NGOs. Other activities include a social
research and publication program, and stakeholder dialogue and
networking. Stakeholder dialogue is directed to "increase internal
awareness of societal perceptions of development issues," to "increase
external awareness of business realities," and to "keep in touch with
workshops, and
societal expectations" through conferences, symposia,
22
boards.
and
committees
social
in
membership
The 20 years of experience with each of these initiatives has
helped Novartis recognize the value of access, to the information and
worldviews of civil society. There are many guiding principles about
how best to undertake the dialogue between management and
representatives from other segments of civil society. Two experiences
as reflected in the interviews have been helpful in shaping Novartis
policy. First, Kaspar Eigenmann described an interaction that began
in the late 1980s. 23 At a casual dinner following a formal meeting on
chemicals policy, a small group of participants from Ciba-Geigy and
The Ecological Scientific Institutes in Vienna and Freiburg concluded
that dialogue would be more productive than confrontation. They
initiated a series of small informal meetings often with neutral
experts. Initially, neither side told their colleagues about these
discussions, because both assumed their colleagues would judge this
kind of interaction inappropriate. Over time, each side learned to
appreciate the other's logic. Some discussion topics led to joint
research and scientific publication, some only to more talk. In all,
around five projects emerged from this contact. The periodic meetings
continue with new, younger people coming into the process.

Interview with Julie Kane, Vice President, Novartis Corporation, in New
20.
York, N.Y. (Sept. 13, 2002).
See Novartis Found. for Sustainable Dev., at httpJ/www.foundation.novartis.com/
21.
novartisfoundations.htm.
22.
Novartis Found. for Sustainable Dev., StakeholderDialogue & NetworkingWhy Dialogue?,supra note 21, at 11.
Interview with Kaspar Eigenmann, supra note 18.
23.
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Second, a stakeholder experience related by Klaus Leisinger
(Executive Director, Novartis Foundation) involved the importance of
including the decisionmakers in the process. In a joint corporate-NGO
attempt to assess the consequences of Green Gene Technology, senior
corporate and NGO management assigned the dialogic task to staff
specialists. In an effective dialogue over three years, the participants
learned from each other in what Leisinger described as a "discursive
learning curve."
They reached consensus on a series of
recommendations, a consensus to which neither corporate nor NGO
senior management would agree, because they had not participated in
24
the learning curve and could not be convinced.
Based on these kinds of experiences, the Novartis stakeholder
policy states, "We provide relevant information and actively listen to
stakeholders. In assessing controversial products, processes and
technology, we seek dialogue with all stakeholders. '' 25 This policy
extends the business model of listening to the market, to the
sustainable corporate model of listening to the signals from civil
society. As Andreas Seiter explained, "It's important that we tell
them, but even more important that they tell us. When there is a
developing issue which influences our future business strategy, we
should be part of that debate, listening first before we make our
point. ' 26 The idea is to extract issues as they begin to form, long before
they reach the media threshold, at which point the perceptions are set.
If initiated early, discussions are interesting for both sides,
particularly when there is scientific evidence to share. This window of
discussion opportunity can last for up to six years.
2.3 From Concept To Action
While the idea of corporate citizenship is defined by headquarters
as a component of long-term corporate sustainability, managers at the
local levels, where the policy takes effect, face a plethora of immediate
concerns and pressures toward short-term performance targets. Dieter
Wissler described the challenge, "The deeper you go into the
organization, the greater the pressure on short-term results, and the
less a person thinks about corporate social responsibility. For local
managers, corporate citizenship can be seen as a dictate from
headquarters that drains energy from their operating focus. '27
Complicating the distinction between headquarters and the field at

24.
Interview with Klaus Leisinger, President and Executive Director, Novartis
Foundation for Sustainable Development, in Basel, Switz. (Aug. 25, 2002).

25.

Policy on CorporateCitizenship, supra note 14, at 5.

26.
Interview with Andreas Seiter, M.D., Head, Stakeholder Relations, Novartis
International AG, in Basel, Switz. (July 10, 2002).
27.
Interview with Dieter Wissler, Head, Corporate Communication, Novartis
International AG, in Basel, Switz. (July 1, 2002).
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Novartis are differences in the European and U.S. views about the role
of the Global Compact principles in corporate sustainability. What is
clear in the European perception is not as clear in the U.S.
environment.
Norman Walker sees corporate citizenship as a more difficult task
than implementing the HSE Policy, "It poses a deep challenge to a
company and the way it operates, it is much more about our collective
behavior.
This demands a specific attitude throughout the
organization." 28 Erwin Schillinger made a similar comparison to the
Novartis Code of Conduct, initiated on a global basis two years before
the Global Compact, "The Global Compact added a whole new
dimension.
While the Code addresses individual rights and
responsibilities, the Global Compact is an obligation of the company
with the necessity of bringing managerial decisions in line with its
' 29
provisions.
A senior management Steering Committee was formed with the
charge of making corporate citizenship an integral part of line
management, including the information system, performance
measurement, and incentives. A campaign of awareness was initiated
throughout the organization.
Following a series of corporate
announcements, the Corporate Citizenship Policy was one-fourth of the
program at the annual retreat of the most senior Novartis executives
at Interlaken in February 2002, as well as sectoral and regional
management meetings. Discussions were initiated through the
Novartis Intranet. According to Walker,
You need to allow people to understand why you are pursuing these
changes. This is best accomplished by engaging people face-to-face in a
young company like Novartis. The enthusiasm for corporate citizenship
as a strategic initiative has been a pleasant surprise. We found that the
purpose of the company is very important to our people, far more than
just coming to the office day after day. This is something they can
30
relate to.

Alternatively, "While our people in the United States are proud to have
their company endorse the Principles, they are very much focused on
the realities of the marketplace. They are somewhat detached from
'3 1
the Principles and do not see their relevance as a U.S. issue.
The next step was specific guidelines.
In structuring the
guidelines, the Steering Committee prepared an inventory of policy
commitments that relate to the underlying themes of the corporate
citizenship strategy, how it unfolds into specific concerns to be

28.
Interview with Norman Walker, supra note 15.
29.
Interview with Erwin Schillinger, Head, International Coordination,
Novartis International AG, in Basel, Switz. (July 3, 2002).
30.
Interview with Norman Walker, supra note 15.
31.
Interview with Terry Barnett, supra note 11.
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addressed, and to their related policy commitments.
Further
preparation involved the analysis of a wide range of U.N. documents
and various codes of business conduct. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights; and the International Covenant on Economic, Cultural, and
Social Rights provided the broad framework. More specific guidance
on qualitative and quantitative standards was drawn from the
International Labor Organization conventions, recommendations, and
declarations, as well as other specific principles such as the U.N. Code
of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, the U.N. Human Rights
Sub-Commission Draft on Universal Human Rights Guidance for
Companies, and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
Consideration extended, for example, all the way to the possibility of
credit schemes for micro-entrepreneurs in the supply chain. Checklists
for core indicators of minimum requirements and best practices were
prepared. In the end, however, there were surprisingly few specific
standards in these documents.
Four guidelines were issued in June 2002 with a fifth in
formulation. In preparation for a year, these guidelines were debated
internally at all levels of the organization and circulated externally for
comment. Each addresses responsibilities, principles and standards,
the management process, and the reporting criterion unique to the
specific guideline.
Guideline #1: Management of Corporate Citizenship. This initial
guideline regulates the scope and applicability for those that follow. It
sets the structure for the "active management of corporate citizenship."
The broad reach of the document addresses priority conflicts that
might arise between corporate citizenship and short-term operating
objectives that need to be arbitrated; a safe complaint procedure for
employees who report corporate citizenship deficiencies; application of
the principles to Novartis partners; and reporting and audit
procedures, as well as the possibility of commissioning external
auditors.
Guideline #2: Fair Working Conditions. This guideline is directed
to human resources, including the related aspects of human rights.
The creation of a reporting system is an important component of this
guideline. Before the Global Compact, working conditions were
considered to be a local responsibility. Early resistance to reporting
was reminiscent of the early days of the HSE-Why do we have to do
this? What is it really for?
The third Global Compact principle was discussed at length in the
preparation of this guideline. It asks world business "to uphold
freedom of association and effective recognition of the right to
collective bargaining." Jeff Benjamin stated, "Our existing policy is
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union neutral. Our companies make sui generis decisions."3 2 While
the language of the principle itself is neither inflammatory nor risky,
legal staffs and managers of many companies, particularly in the
United States, are concerned that the United Nations will interpret
and measure the principle in ways that put pressure on firms to be pro
union.
The guideline clause on freedom of association recognizes the
employee's right to choose whether to join a trade union or employee
association, but establishes criteria for these associations in terms of
democratic principles, the existence of written statutes, a history of
legal compliance, and that they be free and independent associations
not committed to violence. Additional criteria may be established by
local Novartis companies. As in other Novartis policies, dialogue is
included, "Each Country Service Officer shall establish a
communication process that ensures a free exchange of opinion [with
associates] and a constructive dialogue."
The guideline on wages goes well beyond the Global Compact, "In
each market, full-time wages must be set at or above a level that
covers the market price of a basket of goods and services representing
the subsistence level for an average worker in the town or region in
question." Dependent children are included in this "living wage."
Guideline #3: Business Ethics-Bribes, Gifts, and Entertainment.
This guideline covers a topic not explicitly included as a principle in
the Global Compact, drawing on the provisions of the Novartis Code of
Conduct. Governmental corruption, bribery, and marketing practices,
along with access to medicines were identified by Novartis top
management at the introduction of the Corporate Citizenship policy in
Interlaken as the most important issues facing the industry.3 3 Batzer
sees marketing practices as the toughest part in all of the guidelines,
"How does one find the balance between competing in what has become
a very aggressive market set against the exposure to the damage of
what are viewed as unethical practices, with guidelines that hold
across cultures and legal regimes? '34 The Code of Conduct states, "No
employee shall make any payment, or kickback, or offer improper
financial advantage to an official of a government or a governmentcontrolled entity for the purpose of obtaining business or other
services, as set out in the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of

Interview with Jeff Benjamin, Vice President and Deputy General Counsel,
32.
Novartis Corporation, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 13, 2002).
Ursula Wynhoven, Case Study of How Novartis International AG Has Begun
33.
the Process of Delivering on its Commitment to the Global Compact (July 2002)
(unpublished case study) (on file with author).
34.
Interview with Martin Batzer, supra note 10.
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Foreign Public Officials. ' 35 A true challenge, Christian Seiwald said,
"Corruption is a problem that all companies have to confront.
Solutions can only be home grown. '3 6 There are undoubtedly cases out
there; the task of Novartis is to change that behavior.
Here, especially, senior management must convince everyone in
the company of the seriousness of bribery. Johannes Frey noted,
What headquarters would regard as a corrupting action can make sense
to a local associate focusing on a specific business transaction in a
lenient community who does not internalize the great risk to the
company in an environment where the company needs to prove every
37
day that it lives by its statements.

This guideline defines and prohibits bribing of government
officials directly or through intermediaries.
It addresses the
distinctions between, and provides guidance for, facilitating payments,
gifts and entertainment, charitable donations and cultural
contributions, political donations and contributions, and acceptable
payments. Local managers must explicitly report on their large
transactions and consult with the relevant Corporate Citizenship
Officer for any payments over USD $100. Acts of private bribery are
particularly difficult to assess due to the complex of codes, regulations,
and contractual provisions that apply.
Guideline #4:
Human Rights and Engagement in Society.
Focusing on the human rights issues that become the responsibility of
Novartis, this guideline covers stakeholder engagement and
government relations. The policy recognizes that many human rights
issues occur when local background institutions or governments are
uninterested or not sufficiently empowered to protect human rights
and that Novartis has varying degrees of power to intervene. The
guideline directs a policy of governmental engagement, "Relationships
with governments and other public authorities need to be actively
managed." But, "As a rule, local Novartis companies should be
reluctant to get involved with political parties and take sides in
election campaigns." Advocacy stances are acceptable if managed with
care. Aware of the increasing importance of the cultural, economic,
and social dimensions of human rights, an amended version of this
guideline will be issued in early 2003.
Johannes Frey believes this will be the most difficult guideline to
implement. The margin of judgment is great, as can be the cost of
making a mistake. Managers must let governments and NGOs (groups
with whom they tend to be uncomfortable) into their decisions with the
attendant loss of control.

35.

NOVARTIS, Bribes, Business Entertainment, Gifts, in NOVARTIS CODE OF

CONDUCT 6 (2001).
36.
Novartis, Group Management: Reflecting on Our Role, in CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP, supra note 9, at 8-9.
37.
Interview with Johannes Frey, supra note 13.
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Guideline #5 will concentrate on third party relationships. The
Novartis policy states, "We give priority to business partners,
suppliers, and contractors who share our societal and environmental
values, and we support their efforts to promote these values through
their business activities. 3 8
The questions to be addressed in
translating the policy to guidelines as outlined by Kaspar Eigenmann
include,
How do we assess those who share our values; how is giving preference
different from imposing specific standards; how does one balance how
far to press one's values on third parties and what legal liabilities are
created; how does responsibility differ for subcontractors using Novartis
technology, for suppliers where Novartis takes most of their output, or
where national legal environments are weak?3 9

On a practical basis, where should initial efforts be concentrated-on
the largest subcontractors in the most difficult countries?
The guidelines are in a continuing process of review and revision
as experience is gained and measures refined. Standards will be
clarified as general principles are linked with concrete business
activities.
2.4 EstablishingCredibility
Implementing a long-term corporate citizenship strategy is a
matter not only of actions but also of being perceived as doing a good
job by internal and external stakeholders as well as by the broader
society.
As an integral component of sustainable corporate
development, corporate citizenship becomes a matter of pride for
members of the Novartis organization, generates positive reputational
effects among external stakeholders, and ensures continuation of the
license to operate from the broader society. Following the HSE and
Foundation experience, it is intended that NGOs will have input into
the process, measurements, and targets, as well as certification of the
results.
The active management of corporate citizenship means making it
an integral part of Novartis line management and, to the extent
possible, with third parties. Each of the guidelines concludes with a
section on "reporting criteria and measurement." The internal process
of auditing compliance will follow the procedures of the financial and
HSE audits. Specific responsibilities have been created throughout the
organization and assigned as collateral duties. Novartis has concluded
that making the compliance auditing responsibility a collateral duty at
numerous levels throughout the organization is more effective in

38.
39.

Policy on Corporate Citizenship, supra note 14, at 5.
Interview with Kaspar Eigenmann, supra note 18.
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creating organizational change than fewer specialized personnel. Most
of these collateral duties are currently assigned to the human relations
and legal staffs, although Eigenmann would like to include more line
managers. With an initial emphasis on managerial processes and
auditors serving in a consulting role, the auditing function will
increasingly include performance as measures are refined and targets
set-following the HSE experience. Understanding transparency as a
necessary precondition for credibility, these assessments will be a
component of the Novartis annual report following a process to be
initiated in 2002. At that time, the HSE data and verification, which
have been published in a separate Operational Review since 1996, will
be included in that document.
External monitoring is yet to be resolved. It is accepted in
principle and included in the guidelines but not yet operationalized.
As Leisinger noted, "Independent external verification plays an
important role for the credibility of a company's compliance effortindeed, it is a precondition. . . . The search for consensus should
therefore not focus on the question 'Yes or No' but on the 'How.' 40 As
with all external monitoring systems there are questions of
appropriate expertise, the process and its cost, the protection of
proprietary information, the external monitor's attitudes and
organizational culture as well as their own credibility, and the public
disclosure process and detail. An unusual problem with NGOs as
monitors outlined by Peter Tobler (Compliance Officer) is the breadth
of the Policy set against the typically more narrow focus of the
individual NGO. An ideal external monitor is one with credibility who
is willing to participate with Novartis as they both jointly work to
improve a transparent process. As successful as the HSE external
auditing process has become, it is still a public verification of technical
data collected and reported by Novartis.

3. EXAMPLES OF IMPLEMENTATION
Three examples of applying the principles of the Global Compact
and Corporate Citizenship reflect where Novartis finds itself in the
process at this time. Two projects reflect the issue of access to
medicine unique to the pharmaceutical industry. The third example is
common across industries, particularly those relying on subcontracted
production in developing countries.

40.

Leisinger, supra note 3, at 24.
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3.1 Responsibility for Access To Drugs
It is estimated that over one-third of the world's population lacks
access to essential health services, including drugs. Limitation of
access to treatment is a multifaceted issue involving the absence of
medical services, unreliable health and supply systems, lack of
sustainable financing, irrational selection and use of drugs, as well as
the availability and price of drugs.
Society is evolving to the conclusion that medical care is a human
right, and that the pharmaceutical industry has a unique
responsibility to help sick people gain access to life-saving medicines.
This is an extension of the Global Compact first principle that asks
world business to "support and respect the protection of internationally
proclaimed human rights within their sphere of influence."
In
outlining the specific requirements associated with that principle, the
United Nations directs business responsibility to an extension of the
workplace ensuring the "rights to basic health, education, and housing
(in areas where these are not provided)." The pharmaceutical access to
medicine programs reach well beyond the workplace and local
communities to a broader "sphere of influence" embracing patients far
beyond the traditional stakeholder boundaries. This is a reflection of
Dr. Vasella's early experience in medical practice as well as that of
other physicians in Novartis and the industry. It also recognizes the
view expressed by Vasella, "Unless the pharmaceutical industry
achieves its objectives of being an accepted and valued player in
society, we will be at a disadvantage in every new law and regulation
'4 1
that comes up."
Pharmaceutical companies are responding.
For developing
countries, they are networking with civil society, governmental
agencies, and components of the United Nations. Novartis, for
example, is part of the Global Alliance to Eliminate Leprosy. The firm
donates a multi-drug therapy that can cure the disease in six months
or one year (depending on the disease form). The drug has been
available free of charge since 1995, and Novartis is committed to
continue until leprosy has been eliminated. Through the Novartis
Foundation for Sustainable Development, in conjunction with
governmental agencies, private foundations, the WHO, and the World
Bank, the inadequacies of local health infrastructure, as well as the
fear and prejudice associated with leprosy, are gradually being
overcome. Another partnership with the WHO is for the treatment of
malaria. In conjunction with the Chinese Academy of Military and

41.
Daniel Vasella, M.D., Doing Good is a Sound Strategy, in CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP AT NOVARTIS, supra note 9, at 11.
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Medical Science, Novartis discovered and developed the most potent
anti-malarial for non-complicated Plasmodiumfalciparum. In this
agreement, Novartis is providing the drug at cost. For Novartis
employees and their nuclear families in developing countries, the firm
is involved in the diagnosis, treatment, and care of HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, and malaria. When not available through other sources,
Novartis pays for the cost of assuring this coverage.
Some pharmaceuticals are directly involved in finding treatments
for diseases where there is no viable commercial market, thus posing a
challenge to the wealth maximizing business model. Merck, for
example, developed Mectizan to treat onchocerciasis (river blindness),
a disease that had devastated the populations of rich tropical river
valleys for centuries. Novartis is in the process of creating an Institute
for Tropical Diseases in Singapore, which will concentrate on the
discovery of treatments for these kinds of diseases.
The new research approach of searching for molecular targeting
therapies is expensive, thus driving treatment costs beyond the reach
of many patients. Here, broad patient assistance programs, such as
the Novartis graduated assistance approach to its new drug, Gleevec,
are coming into use.
3.1.1 Research on Tropical Diseases: Example #1
The Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases has recently been
established in collaboration with the Singapore Economic Development
Board. The purpose of this research institute is to discover treatments
for diseases of poverty, beginning with tuberculosis and dengue fever.
At the present time, less than 10 percent of the total pharmaceutical
spending on research is directed toward tropical diseases which
comprise 90 percent of the world's health problems.
The Global Compact was an important stimulus in the decision to
emphasize drug discovery for tropical diseases. Paul Herrling noted,
"Within Novartis, the Global Compact stimulated the discussion of
access to medicines which led to the idea of a tropical disease
laboratory and to Singapore. ''42 On a broader basis, the kind of
awareness reflected in the Global Compact has brought shareholders
from resistance, to acceptance, and now to preference for these kinds of
contributions: "Feedback at shareholder meetings about the Singapore
'43
project has been very positive.

Interview with Paul Herrling, Head, Global Research, Novaris Pharma AG,
42.
in Basel, Switz. (July 4, 2002).
Id.
43.
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Singapore is one of many collaborative efforts of Novartis. 44 As a
non-commercial effort, however, the open nature of its research
environment will be unique. Indeed, the intent of the Institute is to
become a center for developing-country scientists, including a major
training component. Its initial focus on tuberculosis (a bacterial
disease) and dengue fever (a viral infection from parasites) will be
extended to other tropical diseases. Its contribution will be in drug
discovery, seeking other partners for the development of these drugs.
More important than the financial commitment of USD $122
million is access to the Novartis laboratory management skills and
experience in drug discovery.
Beyond that, Novartis will be
contributing specific compounds that may have potential for the
treatment of tropical diseases.
In the drug discovery process, it repeatedly occurs during searches
for a specific therapeutic profile that medicines are found to have
additional beneficial effects in other diseases. One could imagine that
while searching for drugs against the hepatitis C virus, something
useful for dengue fever might be found, and vice versa. This occurs
because evolution uses similar biological mechanisms in different
45
contexts.
Thus, a mechanism is being implemented to redirect compounds
or small molecules that show potential for the treatment of tropical
diseases from the Novartis commercial discovery laboratories to the
Institute. At the time of the interview, Herrling had two of these
compounds on his desk for evaluation. One compound in particular,
while ineffective against cancer, had been identified as a possible
treatment for parasitic tropical infections, given the nature of the
compound and its history.
3.1.2 Ensuring Access To a Viable Commercial Drug: Example #2
The second example involves an economically viable commercial
drug.
A breakthrough in drug discovery, this treatment has
demonstrated unprecedented efficacy in treating a relatively small
population of cancer patients. While it is expensive, Gleevec holds a
virtual "efficacy and tolerability" monopoly in treating specific forms of
leukemia and rare gastrointestinal tumors. The Novartis position is
that all appropriate patients should not be denied access to the drug

44.
Of the over USD $2 billion budgeted annually for research and development,
about one-third is allocated to collaboration with other research centers. This share, in
the upper range for pharmaceutical companies, is deemed necessary in order to to keep
the 300 scientists at Novartis in close contact with the many drug discovery networks of
interest to the firm. The importance of discovery networks is underscored in the 38year history of the Novartis drug Gleevec summarized in the next Section.
45.
Interview with Paul Herrling, supra note 42.
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because of financial reasons. As such, the company has initiated
patient support programs globally.
Gleevec is a young drug with stunning early success in treating
chronic myelogenous leukemia (CML), a disease with a mortality rate
near 25,000 yearly across the world. 46 Paul Herrling described Gleevec
as "a new class of drugs based on understanding the pathway which
leads from the gene to the disease and targeting the therapy to that
specific abnormality. '47 The results of the first clinical trials, begun in
mid-1998 and initially reported in December 1999,48 "took the
oncology-hematology community by storm." Of the 31 patients in this
Phase I trial, all experienced a significant decrease in the number of
cancerous white blood cells (symptomatic of the disease), while onethird experienced very significant reduction or disappearance of cancer
cells with the diseased chromosome. Based on these early results,
Novartis, in rapid fashion, began industrial- scale production in
February 1999 (a complex process taking eight to nine months and
requiring a dozen steps) and initiated its Phase II clinical trials.
Application for approval by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
was completed in March 2001, just 32 months after the first human
trials. This compares to the typical drug development time of six
years. As David Epstein described the process, "We believe this is the
fastest from first dose in man to filing. '4 9 Approval (a process that can
take anywhere from 12 to 18 months normally) was granted in 72 days.
The product was at the wholesalers within 24 hours of approval. It is
currently approved in most countries for treating certain forms of CML
and now certain forms of gastrointestinal stromal tumors (GIST).
Because of the internet, the news of Gleevec has spread rapidly
across the world. At a worldwide price of between USD $2,000 and
$2,500 per month, most patients would not be able to pay for the drug
without insurance or reimbursement through their country's
healthcare system. Novartis management firmly believes a drug with
such a dramatic potential should be available to all appropriate
patients with CML. At the same time, as a breakthrough drug,
Gleevec must provide a profit in order to support additional
investment not only in further study of it, but also for further research
in oncology and other therapeutic areas. The Novartis solution is to

46.
The official name of the drug is Gleevec in the United States and Glivec in
the rest of the world. Before April 2001, it was referred to as ST1571, a term still in
use. Id.

47.

Id.

48.
B.J. Druker, Presentation at the 41st Annual Meeting of the American
Society of Hematology (Dec. 3-7, 1999).
49.
Rhonda Rowland, Cancer Pill Speeds Through Testing, CNN.cOMIHEALTH,
Mar. 1, 2001, at 1, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/Healthlconditions/03/1Olleukemia.drug/
index.html.
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make Gleevec available worldwide through special assistance
programs.
A specific program was devised for the United States because its
healthcare system is not a federally subsidized one as is the case in
most other industrialized countries. This is a graduated program with
patient assistance offered at various levels based on income, assets,
and household size-from receiving the drug free of charge if assets are
below a certain amount and income less than USD $44,300 a year to
paying a graduated portion of the total cost. Assistance extends
beyond five times the poverty level in some instances. (Most donation
programs are limited to less than two times the poverty level.) The
operation of this system in the United States is managed by a third
party-Documedics-with specific expertise in reimbursement
programs in oncology. In the United States, Gleevec is covered by
virtually all private insurance policies, although it is not covered by
Medicare because Medicare only covers injectables or physician
administered drugs and Gleevec is an oral therapy. Patients contact
the Gleevec Reimbursement Hotline to see if they are eligible. This is
the program managed by Documedics, which then assesses the
patient's income, assets, and household status based on the
information provided by the patient, assists in the search for
alternative reimbursement sources and, if necessary, initiates the
Patient Assistance Program. Gleevec is then shipped directly to the
patient. The Gleevec Program is precedent-setting in the U.S. market.
Many pharmaceutical companies, including Novartis, have made drugs
available to those who could not afford them, but no one else to date
has published a graduated support system based on a patient's ability
to pay. This program works due to the dependability of medical
diagnosis, the assistance of the physician's office staff and the Novartis
sales force, access to Documedics, and the breadth and uniformity of
private healthcare coverage.
A different kind of program is operational outside the United
States-the Glivec International Patient Assistance Program (GIPAP).
This is not an additional reimbursement program, but is rather a
donation program that follows specific criteria. Outside the United
States, the nature of the healthcare systems and the quality of
infrastructures vary dramatically. In many countries, the government
healthcare system subsidizes pharmaceuticals. A large number of
countries, however, do not have health insurance-private or
governmental. For these countries, Novartis has initiated the GIPAP
Program. Through GIPAP, Glivec is made available in countries
where it is approved for treating certain forms of CML and GIST.
Qualified patients are those who are properly diagnosed, not insured,
not reimbursed, and have no other financial recourse (unable to pay
privately).
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In order to ensure that appropriate patients are considered for
this drug therapy, applications for GIPAP assistance must be initiated
by physicians on behalf of their patients. The physician must be
involved in all stages of the treatment (diagnosis, prescription, and
follow-through). This regulation is in accordance with the WHO, which
provides global guidance on essential drugs and medicines, and works
with individual countries on implementation of national drug policies.
The Max Foundation, an international nonprofit organization
dedicated to people with leukemia and other blood-related diseases,
administers GIPAP.5 0 Most communication with the Max Foundation
is through the Internet. The creativity of this approach is the reliance
on the physician and the use of the Internet as the systemic vehicle.
Together, these minimize the distributional infrastructure. Thus,
both Gleevec, as a young drug, and its distribution systems are works
in progress.
3.2 Ensuring the Rights of Workers: Example #3
An early step in implementing the Global Compact was a baseline
survey undertaken by the Steering Committee to assess issues relative
to compliance with the principles and to identify areas of sensitivity to
human rights abuses where Novartis operations could be vulnerable.
Of particular concern were third-party activities.
While Novartis has no legal liability for the stakeholders of
subcontracting firms, it was determined that this is a component of the
human rights policy as indicated in the Global Compact and because
the well being of subcontractor stakeholders is affected by the
activities of Novartis. This is particularly true when the stakeholders
do not have adequate local background institutions to represent their
interests. In Western Europe and the United States, society has
decided that these third-party stakeholders are the responsibility of
the multinational, a view that can conflict with those of the developing
world.
This third example arose from the baseline vulnerability
assessment based on the Global Compact Principle six, "to uphold the
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation." In addition, the second principle asks world business "to
make sure they are not complicit in human rights abuses." The initial
vulnerability questionnaire identified two examples. To the surprise of
management, one was in Basel where a janitorial contracting firm was
paying less than the community standard. Another example was the
existence of pregnancy testing at a subcontracting production facility
in a developing country free trade zone. The management of the plant
was pregnancy testing job applicants during a pre-employment

50.

Applications are available at http://www.themaxfoundation.org.
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physical without the applicant's knowledge, and denying employment
to pregnant women. Before the Global Compact emphasis on human
rights, pregnancy testing had never surfaced as a part of Novartis'
anti-discrimination policy.
As with most human rights issues, there were a number of
complicating factors: the production facility was owned and managed
by the local government, as was the whole free trade zone; undisclosed
pregnancy testing was not against the law; and it was the policy across
the free trade zone where a condition of employment was that the
worker be unmarried and not pregnant. The senior plant management
believed they were making an important contribution to the applicant
by providing a physical examination-perhaps the first in her life. It
was argued, because most of these applicants were migrant workers
from distant, remote villages, they should know about their pregnancy
in time to return home for the birth and for the nurturing environment
of the extended family-an environment that could not be replicated at
the plant site. The management of the plant and that of the free trade
zone were convinced their policy was the best for the applicant, for the
free trade zone, and for their society.
The counterargument, based on the dignity of the applicant, was
that pregnancy is such a central and unique component of a woman's
identity, even though others may treat the issue with great respect,
the woman herself should decide whether to reveal her pregnancy and
determine what would be best for herself and her child.
Pregnancy testing can be viewed both as a form of sex
discrimination and a violation of a woman's right to privacy. While sex
discrimination is prohibited by ILO convention, it does not explicitly
address pregnancy testing. The U.N. Human Rights Committee has
called on Member States to include the right to privacy in their legal
codes, although few have.
Denying employment on the basis of pregnancy can, in many
countries, pit local practice against global hypernorms. Is this an area
where global society should, and has the right, to overrule local
practice? Local Novartis management argued that pregnancy testing
was an accepted practice in the country as directly represented by the
government-owned facility and management of the zone, insisting that
a change would jeopardize the relationship with the plant that had
demonstrated acceptable overall standards for labor practices over an
extended period of time and was a model plant for its environment (as
confirmed by an on-site monitoring visit). Beyond the pregnancy
testing issue, insisting on a change of policy could have a negative
effect across a broad range of other interactions between Novartis and
the government.
This issue found its way to the Novartis Executive Committee,
consisting of the top eight executives in the company. The Committee
with Vasella, as chairman, judged that the practice was, indeed,
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discriminatory and would be immediately stopped. The current policy
is that pregnancy testing is offered cost-free as part of the application
physical, but is not a condition of employment.

4. PRESENT STATUS

In a pharmaceutical company, long-term performance depends
upon the success of research and development as well as the marketing
of useful and safe pharmaceutical products, plus the managerial
acumen to achieve the financial results needed to sustain that research
and development. For Novartis, the spirit of the Global Compact
becomes a strategic component of sustainable corporate development
as it is interwoven with the business model and cuts across the
economic, social, and environmental aspects of decision-making. These
principles, particularized in the Corporate Citizenship Policy, help the
firm meet the expectations of society so critical for its long-term
development. Implementation depends upon the ability to continually
refine the process of measuring, setting, and achieving targets for the
human rights dimension of Novartis and third-party operations within
an overall vision; the capability of line management to integrate
corporate citizenship into the economic business model, and to settle
tensions between competing objectives as they arise; and the
credibility of the process as perceived by internal and external
stakeholders, as well as the broader society.
Novartis is midstride in bringing its strategy of long-term
corporate sustainability to fruition.
Top management has
operationalized the principles of the Global Compact as evidenced by
the above examples reflecting the uniqueness of the pharmaceutical
discovery and distribution of drugs, and as a multinational
subcontracting its production to third parties. These outcomes are
measurable in terms of drugs discovered, patients served, and rights
protected. Still, these are senior management initiatives. The goal of
integrating Corporate Citizenship into the mindset of the operating
manager remains a work in process. The question is whether the
process of implementation and compliance is up to the challenge. It
promises to be a more daunting task than either the Health, Safety,
and Environment success or the Code of Conduct.
The vision is clear, as is the determination of senior management.
The publication of guidelines in June 2002 initiated the system of
standards and accountability, a system that appears capable of
evolving toward fulfilling the vision. Credibility is an open question.
Internal credibility will grow with the implementation process. Based
on experience, Novartis management is convinced their policy of early,
open dialogue with external stakeholders will lead to better decisions
and to credibility. Verification will be part of the social as well as the
environmental process. Formal, external monitoring has yet to be
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introduced. This is a continuing process. As Vasella noted, "The policy
incorporates our aspirations-recognizing that we still have some
' ' 51
areas where we do not yet live up to the policy.

51. Vasella, supra note 9.
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Appendix A
Novartis AG
Performance Data
1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

Revenues (CHF billion)

20.0

23.1

23.2

25.2

29.1

32.0

Research and
Development (CHF
billion)

3.1

3.7

3.2

3.5

4.0

4.2

Overall Operating
(b
Margins )

18.8%

21.8%

24.8%

25.1
%

23.1%

22.7%

24.6%(c)

27.9%()

31.0%

29.8%

28.1%

30.2%

28.5%

29.1%

30.6
%
36.3

27.9%

24.1%

16.7%

20.7%

20.7%

19.4

17.6%

17.8%

27.3%

24.5%

32.8%

29.2
%

30.2%

23.4%

58.0%

61.0%

62.5%(b)

60.6

62.3%

63.0%

6.0%

6.3%
22.7%(d)

6.6%
20.5%

7.2%
22.1
%

6.8%
22.4%

7.6%
20.8%

Financial Performance (a)

Pharmaceutical
Operating Margins
Industry (d)

Return on Equity (e)
Industry (d)

Business Sectors (a)
Pharmaceuticals
Generics
Consumer Health

2 6 . 0 %(d)

CIBA Vision
Animal Health

6.0%
4.0%

6.1%
3.9%

6.5%
3.9%

6.4%
3.7%

4.8%
3.7%

5.6%
3.0%

Financial Market
Assessment
Price/Earnings Ratios
Novartis Hi
Novartis Lo
Industry (d)Hi
Industry(d) Lo
Market/Book Ratios
Novartis
Industry (W)

na
na
27.4
19.8

34.0
19.6
44.8
28.3

31.0
22.4
50.9
32.8

31.5
21.0
42.9
30.3

26.3
17.5
39.4
24.3

28.6
19.9
na
na

3.8
7.0

6.6
15.5

6.4
22.6

4.4
16.2

6.1
18.1

4.3
na

Footnotes
a. Agriculture is not included because it was divested in 2000.
b. Operating Income/Sales.
c. Healthcare operating margins
d. Standard & Poor's Analysts' Handbook.
e.

Novartis financial leverage is substantially below the average for the industry. For Novartis,
Debt/Total Assets averaged 5.8% from 1996-2000, compared to an industry average of 9.5%.

*

*

*

